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of Limited Liability Companies in
the Spectrum of Business Forms
F OR most of this century, state law has provided participants
in jointly owed business ventures with three principal busi-
ness forms-the corporation, the general partnership, and the
limited partnership. In the past four years, over two-thirds of the
states, including Oregon, have enacted legislation authorizing a
new business form-the limited liability company (LLC). It ap-
pears likely that the LLC will soon supplant the two forms of
* Dean 1994-1996 and Loran L. Stewart Professor of Business Law, University of
Oregon School of Law.
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partnership as a principal business form, and that it will challenge
the corporation as the form of choice for closely held firms.'
Corporate form separates ownership function into three
realms: (1) the shareholder's residual claimant realm; (2) the di-
rectors' monitoring realm; and (3) the specialized managerial
services realm of the officers. Additionally, corporate form insu-
lates shareholders, directors, and managers from personal liabil-
ity for corporate obligations. Finally, even major changes in
corporate form or policies are decided by majority rule. These
corporate attributes make corporate form ideal for firms that
need to: (1) obtain substantial amounts of capital from public in-
vestors; (2) obtain specialized management and monitoring serv-
ices from another set of individuals; and (3) quickly adapt to
changed circumstances. Conversely, corporate form is not as
ideal for firms that do not need to raise capital from passive,
widely dispersed investors, and, therefore, do not need to employ
directors to monitor the activities of managers to ensure that pas-
sive investors' interests are protected.2
Many commentators argue that general partnership form re-
flects and protects the expectations and needs of the archetypical
closely held firm3 better than does corporate form.' The stan-
dard form provisions of partnership law grant all ownership func-
tions to the general partners. Moreover, changes to the
partnership agreement or decisions, other than ordinary business
matters, require the consent of all partners. Thus, partnership
law's default rules guarantee that partners may serve the partner-
ship as long as they choose and may not have their share of prof-
its reduced without their consent. Moreover, unlike corporate
form, which provides liquidity in form but not substance to inves-
tors in closely held firms, general partnership form ensures li-
1 See Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of
Partnership, 70 WASH. U.L.Q. 417 (1992).
2 For an economic analysis of the corporate form see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991);
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW (Roberta Romano ed. 1993); OLIVER E. WIL-
LIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELA-
TIONAL CONTRACTING (1985).
3 The archetypical closely held firm is a jointly owned enterprise with modest capi-
tal needs whose owners are able to both manage the firm and effectively monitor
each other to prevent misconduct or shirking.
4 See John A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation:
A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA.
L. REV. 1 (1977).
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quidity to investors. Any partner may dissolve the partnership at
will, and then require that the partnership assets be sold and the
proceeds be distributed to each partner according to her share.
For "in-between" closely held firms5 neither partnership or
corporate form is ideal. Both managers and investors in these
firms may strongly prefer corporate law rules insulating them
from personal liability for other than personal misconduct. Ad-
ditionally, partnership dissolution-at-will rules may impose unac-
ceptably high risk of minority opportunism. On the other hand,
corporate law's majority rule, separation of function, and entity
permanence may expose minority investors and managerial em-
ployees to significant risk of majority opportunism. Moreover,
choice of corporate form exposes the incorporated enterprise to
federal income tax treatment as a corporation rather than as a
partnership.
LLCs may prove ideal for in-between closely held firms. Gen-
erally speaking, the LLC: (1) offers passive investors and active
participants limited liability; (2) provides default rules that en-
sure taxation as a partnership; and (3) ensures liquidity to with-
drawing members while providing a modicum of entity
permanence and protection from minority opportunistic
withdrawal.
The catch in this summation is the modifier "generally." The
downside of the LLC phenomena is the lack of uniformity and
certainty that will exist for some period of time. The acts
adopted by the various states differ in subtle but important ways.
Further, there is no case law to rely on in interpreting the statute
of a particular state. Accordingly, practitioners can take no com-
fort in statements that purport to provide a general characteriza-
tion of the LLC.
This Symposium presents an array of articles addressing the
Oregon Limited Liability Company Act (the Act). The articles
are designed to give both practitioners and policymakers insight
into both Oregon's version of the LLC and its cousins in other
jurisdictions.
5 By "in-between" closely held firms, I mean firms with a significantly greater
need for adaptability and capital than the archetypical closely held firm, but which
do not have sufficient need for capital or adaptability to justify becoming publicly
traded firm. For comparative analysis of the organizational needs of firms depend-
ing on their relative need for capital and adaptability see Charles R. O'Kelley, Fill-
ing Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 Nw. U.
L. REv. 216 (1992).
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The first two articles provide a comprehensive overview of the
tax ramifications of selecting an LLC. David Culpepper leads off
with a complete analysis of the Internal Revenue Service Regula-
tions and rulings determining whether an LLC will be classified
as a partnership or a corporation for federal income tax pur-
poses. Mark Golding then examines the tax consequences of
converting an existing partnership or corporation into an LLC.
An issue of importance for at least the short term is what law
will govern an Oregon LLC that conducts business in states that
do not recognize LLCs. Erich Merrill explores the conflict of law
rules and factors that will govern a forum state's resolution of
this issue, and pinpoints the role of private ordering in maximiz-
ing an Oregon LLC's chances of receiving a favorable result.
The Symposium next moves to a consideration of the default
rules of Oregon's Act as they relate to internal governance of an
LLC. Mark Golding examines in detail the financial aspects of
an Oregon LLC. Practitioners and students alike will find Gold-
ing's use of hypotheticals particularly helpful, as well as his inte-
gration of tax considerations into his analysis. Thomas Sayeg
then focuses on the flexibility of the management provisions of
Oregon's Act.
The Symposium concludes with four student pieces. John Mar-
tel and Tanya Hanson address the fiduciary duty aspects of
LLCs, including comparisons with other business forms. Patrick
Inouye provides an overview of the lack of uniformity in existing
state LLCs acts and provides insight into how this new business
form is likely to evolve. Finally, David Kopilak offers an articles
of organization and operating agreement checklist for Oregon
LLCs.
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